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FOREWORD
In this paper Dr Nevin assesses the competitive
position of Irish manufacturing industry as a whole and in
industrial groups on the bmsis mainly of census of
production statistics for certain countries.     His method
is a very interesting one.    On the basis of actual labour
costs and the author’s own estimates of the stock of fixed
capital, to which are applied a "normal" rate of return,
in comparison with actual net output, he computes, in
effect, the existing surplus return to capital as well as
the probable return when tariff protection is withdrawn.
This surplus "fat" or the lack of it is the measure of the
relative viability of the industrial group.
At many points throughout the paper the author
emphasises the purely statistical difficulties with which
he has had to contend, particularly because of inter-
national differences in statistical practice.     ~very
effort has been made to ensure that the comparisons
attempted are not invalidated by these differences, and
authoritative criticism and advice has been sought from
several of the European countries involved in them.     In
particular, the study has been referred to those responsible
for the United Nation~ publication on which the study
relies to a major extent for its basic data in order to
ensure that those used are broadly consistent from a
definitional point of view.    Nevertheless~ as the author
stresses, the data are still bound to be limited by the
inadequacies of census of production returns at a national
level as well as by international differences in the
relationship between net output and value added, which
would have been more suitable for the present analysis but
such statistics are not available from the census of
production.
Hence, in the author’s words in paragraph S,
the reader must therefore "judge for himself the point -
if, in his view, it does occur - at which the resort to
arbitrary assumption as a means of overcoming deficiencies
in the available statistical data becomes so great as to
rob the subsequent analysis of any meaningful significance."
This defines the spirit in which the paper is presented.
Apart from the conclusion, the statistics and statistical
analyses and methods will be found to be useful and
interesting - notably the estimates of fixed capital stock
of Irish industry - in their own right.
Nothing more than broad orders of comparative
magnitude could possibly be expected from a study of this
kind.    Given the existing lack of quantitative data on
the Common Market issue, however - obviously the crucial
policy problem facing Ireland today - any analysis which
arrives at the roughest of estimates from a detached and
dispassionate examination could hardly fail to be of
interest to the public as a whole.     Individual
industrialists, disposing of much more detailed information
about their enterprises than available to the muthor for
the industry as a whole, may be interested to apply his
methods to their own data.
R. C. Geary
Director "
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
The possible entry of Ireland into the Common
Market poses a number of policy questionsi amongst which
that of the capacity of Irish industry to withstand open
competition from Europe must inevitably oocupy an
especially important position.    For th@ most part, Irish
industries are currently operating within the protection
of a substantial tariff wall which would necessarily
disappear as integration into the Common Market proceeds.
What are their prospects of survival in a situation of
virtually unrestricted competition from and with European
industry ?
The present study attempts to throw some light on
the order of magnitude of the problem facing the major
groups of Irish manufacturing industries.     It has to be
stated flatly at the outset, however, that the task of
assessing the efficiency of particular industrial groups
in any pr@cise sense has so far proved an impossible one.
The concept of efficiency itself is not unambiguous;
even if it were, the data whicll would be required for its
measurement are not available internationally on a
strictly comparable basis.
The analysis presented in the following pages
therefore contains, of necessity, an element of
arbitrary judgement and assumption which is certainly
large enough to deny to the results any pretensions to
dispassionate and objective precision.    The judgements
and assumptions are displayed whenever they are introduced
(1) I am much indebted to a large number of people who
were good enough to read through, and comment on, an
earlier draft of this paper.    They are too numerous to
mention individually, but the study is much improved as a
result of their ass±stance.
2however, and the sequence of the analysis is such that the
relative importance of these elements increases as the
argument proceeds.    The reader can therefore judge for
himself the point - if, in his view, it does occur - at
which the resort to arbitrary assumption as a means of
overcoming deficiencies in the available statistical data
becomes so great as to rob the subsequent analysis of any
meaningful significance.
The sections which follow are concerned with
successive stages of the problem of attempting an
international comparison of the competitive strength of
Irish industry.    Part II addresses itself to the question
of relative labour costs; in Part III some attempt is made
to estimate capital costs in a comparable manner, and thus
to arrive at a comparison of total factor costs in
manufacturing industry in several countries.     Finally,
Part IV advances some assessment of the adjustments which
would be necessary to these comparisons in order to allow
for the influence of the varying levels of tariff protection
which prevail currently in these different countries.
PART II: LABOUR COSTS
The measurement of productivity.
The productivity of labour is conventionally
measured by means of the division of an index of production
by an index of numbers employed.     This device has only
limited uses.     In the first place, it refers to changes
over a period of time only, revealing nothing of absolute
productivity; secondly, it regards labour as homogeneous
and makes no allowance for differences in sex, skill,
intensity of effort or - most important - relative wage-
levels; finally, it tends to imply that all changes in
productivity are attributable to labour, which patently
conflicts with reality.
Some of the weaknesses of the conventional
measure of labour productivity are r~medied by the
substitution of the absolute value of net output for an
index of production.     By net output is meant here, of
course~ the difference between the gross value of output and
the costs of fuel, raw materials, semi-finished goods etc.
consumed in the course of producing that output.(3)    This
differs from industry to industry either because a given
output is produced from    different amounts of raw materials
and/or components or__ because one industry is capable of
producing more from a given amount of raw materials than
(4)
another.
In Table i such a comparison for 195~ is attempted
for a number of European countries, most of which are present
or prespective members of the E.E.C., and for some major
non-European trading nations.    The statistics from which
this comparison has been calculated were drawn from a United
(2)This is not to say, of course, that such comparisons may
not have their value as indicators of changes in overall
incomes and standards of living, irrespective of the precise
causes of such changes.
($)In other Words, "net output" is used in the Census of
Production sense.     The term "value added" is more suitably
reserved for the contribution of an industry to the national
product, for which purposes net output is further reduced by
subtracting the cost of transport, advertising etc. performed
by outside firms and various other supplementary costs.
Value added, in this sense, should ideally be used in the
analysis which follows, rather than net output; it does not
seem possible however, to derive any consistent correction
factor to census data at an international level.    Even within
a particular country the adjustment for national income
purposes is generally effected in a rather rough-and-ready way.
(4)For the sake of brevity, the expression "materials" will
often be used in what follows, in the context of net output,
as a shorthand expression for all the products consumed by
an industry in its operations, including fuels~ components
and semi-finished goods as well as raw materials in the
ordinary sense of the term.    The distinction is of particular
importance for Irish industry,
Strictly speaking, of course, the expressions
"greater output with constant input" and "constant output
with smaller input" can be regarded as synonymous for the
purposes of productivity analysis only if the production
functions involved are assumed to be linear and homogeneous~
4Nations publication, and a great deal of the subsequent
analysis also draws heavily on the data presented in this
publication.(5)     It can be assumed, therefore, that everything
possible has been done to make the data broadly comparable
internationally and, in particular, that the values for net
output in different countries do not include the irrelevant
but highly distorting components of subsidies and indirect
taxation.(6)    Since the U.N. publication did not include
net output data for Germany in i953, these had perforce to
(7)be estimated.
Three points of a statistical nature should be
mentioned at this point.     First, even within any given
country it is known that the Census of Production is
frequently imperfect in its coverage, while its returns are
even more frequently incorrectly completed,     The more detailed
the analysis built upon the Census, of course, the greater the
caution called for as a result of these weaknesses in the
basic data.    3econdly, in order to achieve the international
(5)Patterns of Industrial Growth, 1938-1958, United Nations,
New York, 1960, (59.XVII.6), Part II.
(6)The compilers of the publication have been good enough to
confirm that the net output figures for all the countries
referred to in the present study are valued at factor cost
except those for Germany and Japan.    An estimated correction
has been made accordingly to the German figures but data are
not readily available which would enable a similar correction
to be made for Japan.    The results for Japan should therefore
be considered with this factor in mind throughout.    National
income data indicate that the net output of Japanese
manufacturing industry in 1953 was about 21 per cent greater
than the value added, although not all of this difference is
attributable to the taxation factor.    It would seem safe to
assume that all the Japanese coefficients shown in this study
are some 10-15 per cent too high because of the inclusion of
taxes in the value of net output.
One other complicating element is the presence of some
variability between the countries concerned in the matter of
size coverage in the census of production; in some countries
virtually all industrial establ±shments are included, whereas
in others the Census covers only those employing more than a
minimum number of persons.     The compilers of the U.N~
publication are of the opinion that the impact of thi~ factor
on the results oE the present study is unllkely to be
substantial, except possibly in the ease of France, where
some understatement of the coefficients may have resulted in
relation to those of the Scandinavian countries, Australia
and Japan..
(7)A set of statistical tables, and explanatory notes thereto,
showing the details underlying this and subsequent calculations
in this study is available on request from the Institute.
TABLH I : OUTPUT PHR HEAD IN ~ANUFACTURING INDUSTRY% IN ~ U.S.,
Pood, Drink9
Tobacco
2. Textiles
3. Clothing
4o Wood
5. Paper
6. Printing
7. Leather
8. Rubber
19. Chemicals
O. Minerals
]I. Metals
12. Metal ProductsI
!13. Other.
I
I All Manufacturing
i
DENMARK: -    FRANCS
2,861
19980
19720
19893
2~471
29717
3~254
2~124
39627
27645
4,870
29298
2~2!i
SUROPH.
GSRrCANY IRELAND N~WA7 S~{EDEN U.K. (A) AUSTRALIA
1953.
OI’RfIR ~
CANADA JAPAN NEW ZEALAND
29413
2
19777
i~657
i~234
19571
2~191
!~957
1,200
i~991
3,080
19720
19914
29003
19883
1~854
19955
1~/~2
1~378
19382
29581
2~087
1~559
29590
39733
2~155
2~953
2,101
i~600
2,146
4
2)253
t~225
1,053
1,228
1~643
19601
1,660
N A.
2~191
19666
1,596
1~494
1,463
1,640
5~538
1~944
1,692
1~580
3,399
2,238
2~252
29559
3,483
29434
4,196
29364
2~783
2,839
39656
29216
1~981
2~290
39671
39134
29245
3,262
4~446
2~914
3~071
29618
19~5
1~340
1 o 864
2 ~ 741
2~387
1,889
29340
3~694
2,231
2~TlO
8
3~235
2~485
i~846
2~441
39902
27830
2~526
3~148
49689
2,904
3,445
9
69553
37796
3~491
4,442
99372
59607
3,637
7,877
9,201
~186
8,244
10
966
695
507
549
1,528
1,181
791
17113
1,860
1,074
1~478
2,937
29439
2,928
29189
2~050
2,242
29541
2,579
2,736     1
I
6,261 999
4,834 667
6,205 1,004
11
3,88t
2,704
19676
3,061
4,380
3,252
2,443
49457
4,524
4~155
3,958
2,920
2,360
U.s.(A)
12
8,123
4~566
49249
59049
3,6!1
U~557
5,190
T9709
129452
7~644
8,376
7,838
6,485
NOTH: (A) 1954.
5comparisons shown in Table I it was necessary to translate
national currencies into a single common unit through the
official exchange rates prevailing in 195Z.     It is well
known that such conversions are often of dubious validity
because of the limitations of exchange rates as a measure
of comparative purchasing power.(8)    In the context of
international trade, however~ the objection disappears;
whatever their accuracy as indicators of internal prices,
official exchange rates are the effective device by means of
which internal costs are translated into prices in export
markets.(9)
Finally, it has to be emphasised that the technical
content of any given industrial category may vary considerably
from one country to another.     The category "chemicals", for
example, may be broadly similar in, say, the United Kingdom
and Germany, but the Irish chemical industry is different in
nature from either.    At the same time, the extent to which
this factor invalidates comparison should not be exaggerated.
In the last resort it is net output per unit of resources
which is being examined, and the precise nature of an industry
cannot alter the fact that the value of output in relation
to cost~ however much industries may differ~ is the ultimate
criterion of competitive strength.
2. Labour coefficient
While the use of net output per head eliminates
some of the inadequacies of the crude output-per-head index-
number technique mentioned earlier, it still retains two of
its major deficiencies.    In the first place, it treats
labour as a homogeneous input.    While it may be an
informative analysis in the context of welfare comparisons~
(8)The best-known demonstration of this is perhaps M. Gilbert
and I. Kravis2 An international comparison of purchasing
powers, O.E.E.C. , Paris 1958.
(9)This is not to say, of courser that other factors - tariffs
or transport costs, for example - do not also enter into
~he p~D~e~s of t~anS!a~ion~
6(iO)
therefore, it has little usefulness for an investigation
of international competitiveness.    In the latter context it
is axiomatic that the absolute level of per capita net
output is of little significance; the important concept
is labour-cost per unit of output, which is a very different
matter.
A more revealing comparison for the purposes of
the present paper is therefore obtained by expressing net
output as a ratio of total labour costs - i.e. wages and
salaries - rather than per unit of labour employed.     By
doing so, several disadvantages of the per capita output
technique are removed.     Overtime or short-time working,
for example, are to a large extent taken care of, as are
differences in the age, sex and skill of workers, assuming
that all these things are reflected in earnings.    Most
important, the actual cost of labour is allowed form~not
its numerical strength.    What is being measured is not
output per head in a given year but the value of output
per pounds-worth, or dollars-worth or francs-worth, as the
case may be, of labour input - what will be called the
labour coefficient in what follows.    The currency unit
becomes irrelevant; the comparison is concerned with the
relative rates of transformation of labour into product.
There is a further point of some importance.
A comparison of absolute net outputs in different countries
(after allowing for the effect of tariffs) would implicitly
involve the assumption that a given value of net output
represents the same real wealth in the different countries
being compared - i.e. that price-levels in the various
countries were equal when converted at prevailing exchange
(~o) Although here the objections to the use of official
exchange rates mentioned earlier become distinctly relevant,
of course.
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rates.    The division of net output by factor costs,
however - wages and, subsequently capital charges - avoids
the need for this assumption of equality of price-levels.
In effect it measures the surplus over and above factor
costs (roughly identifiable with the profit margin) in
real terms - that is to say, in terms of the factors of
production which it could purchase in its own economy.
For example, if in a given industry the labour
coefficient was 1.8 in country A and 2.0 in country B, the
comparison would in effect be indicating that for every
IOO units of labour employed (man-hours, man-years etc.)
the margin left over to meet capital charges and profits
would be equal to 80 in country A and IO0 in country B.
Subsequently an attempt is made to include capital as well
as labour costs so as to arrive at an overall coefficient
~ndicating the surplus available in different ~ndustries and
countries (measured in real terms) for profit only.
Substantial d&fferences in the coefficients would thus
indicate corresponding differences in the magnitude of the
problem which would be presented to an industry through the
advent of unrestricted competition from similar industries
abroad having a larger profit surplus.
One further consideration of a statistical kind
should be mentioned in connection with international
comparisons based on national statistics of labour costs.
Wages and salaries paid are not entirely synonymous with
labour costs in the modern economy.    The United Nations
data employed here refer to all payments, whether in cash
or kind, made in connection with the work.    There is one
element in labour costs, however, whose omission might be
regarded sufficiently serious to qualify substantially the
usefulness of the U.N. data for international labour-cost
comparisons, namely employers’ contributions to compulsory
social security schemes.(II)    Such payments could obviously
(11)
I am indebted to Mr. Garret Fitzgerald for drawing my
attention to this very important point.
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be held to be as much part of the cost of using labour as
wages paid in cash; furthermore, their magnitude varies
considerably between countries, and in some European countries
they are a significant fraction of wage and salary cash
payments.
An adjustment has therefore been made to the U.N.
wage data for European countries to allow for this element.
The extent to which the U.N. totals for wages were increased
is shown by the following coefficients:-
Denmark 1.15
France 1.23
Germany 1.10
Ireland 1.02
Norway 1.01
Sweden 1.01
United Kingdom 1.62
No adjustment has been made to the wage data for the non-
European countries included in the comparisons,     Data on
which such an adjus%ment could be based are nor available,
but in any case it is believed that compulsory social
security payments by employers in these countries are small
in relation to total wages and salaries.
Important as it is, however, labour is not the
only element in industrial costs and efficiency.    The
analysis must therefore now proceed to the second major
weakness of the output-per-head approach: its neglect of
differences in the amounts of capital with which labour is
working¯
PART III: CAPITAL COSTS
i. The problem of measurement
Broadly speaking, the cost of labour used in
production can be regarded as accurately measured by
wages and salaries paid.    The cost of land is probably
so small, for manufacturing industry, in relation to total
9costs that it can safely be neglected.(12)    No comparison
of production costs can hope to be meaningful, however, if it
makes no estimates at all of the costs involved in the
capital employed.
Unfortunately it must be admitted that the problem
of measuring the amount off capital employed in industry is,
in any precise sense, insoluble.     There are immense
conceptual and statistical difficulties in valuing industrial
capital for a particular industry in a particular country;
these are naturally multiplied when an international
comparison is attempted.     Yet without such a comparison,
the international position of Irish industry cannot
possibly be assessed.
The present analysis adopts an entirely
arbtirary device in order to make some attempt to resolve
this dilemma.    The only statistical data available on an
internatinnal basis having some direct connection with
capital equipment in manufacturing industry are those
provided (for 1953 in most cases) in the United Nations
study previously referred to(13) on the capacity of installed
power equipment.     BY this is meant the total horse-power of
installed prime movers not driving electric generators plus
that of all installed electric motors.(14)     In other words,
power equipment used only to generate electricity is excluded,
so that comparability between industries or countries is not
compromised by differences in the relative importance of
electricity supplied by outside undertakings (e.g. a national
grid), on the one hand, and electricity generated within the
(12)The "cost of land and other fixed assets" purchased by
Irish manufacturing industry in 1958 amounted to 0.6 per cent
of total expenditure on plant, buildings and other fixed
assets.
(i3) See footnote (5) above.
(14)
Alternatively, the capacity of all prime movers plus
that of electric motors driven by purchased electricity.
lO
consuming enterprises on the other.    If these data are
adopted as indicators of the total capital employed in an
industry in effect the assumption is being made that each
unit (in terms of capacity) of power equipment in a
particular industry connotes an equal volume of all forms
of capital - including buildings - in every country being
compared.
The violence of this assumption scarcely requires
stress.     It is perhaps least heroic when the industrial
group in question can be assumed to be reasonably
homogeneous (in respect of its capital-using habits) between
various countries; it ~ecomes unworkable if an industry
differs substantially in nature from country to country,
even though its statistical description may be the same.
An example of this is the industry described as "paper and
paper products"; in Canada and the Scandinavian countries
this industry is largely concerned with the basic processes
of transforming timber into pulp and basic products, whereas
in other European countries pulp is largely imported and the
industry is mainly concerned with processing into the more
complex and later paper products.     In such a situation the
assumption that the capacity of installed power equipment
bears a more or less stable ratio to total oapital clearly
breaks down.
Even granted this assumption - that power-equipment
capacity is a reliable index of capital employed - the data
on horse-power of such equipment have still ~o be translated
into value equivalents in the currency of each country
involved.    Allowance must obviously be made for the fact
that i00 HP of power equipment will imply a different value
for the corresponding "other" capital equipment in the metal
manufacture industry than int say, the textile industry.
The choice of procedure for this piece of the analysis is
in effect determined by the fact that the United Kingdom
appears to be one of the very countries for which capital
ii
estimates are available on a detailed industrial basis
comparable with that on which the U.N. power-equipment
statistics are presented.     Theprocedure adopted has
therefore been:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
classification of U.I[. capital data (in ~ million
at 1953 prices) on an industrial basis comparable
to that for power-equipment;
conversion of horse-power of equipment in each
industry in the U.K. into £ per HP;
conversion of HP power-equipment in similar
industries for other countries in 1953 into
equivalent by means of the conversion rates
emerging from (b); and
translation of results at (c) into own-currencies
by means of the appropriate foreign exchange rate.
It seems likely that, by using Dr. Barna~s
estimates as a basis, the resulting estimates for other
countries will tend to be rather high in comparison with
such other estimates as are available.     Barna’s figures
are derived from insurance valuations and, in so far as
they can be compared, result in substantially higher totals
than those obtained for manufacturing industry in the
United Kingdom by the "perpetual inventory" method employed
by Mr. Philip Redfern.    Comparing the two sets of estimates~
Barna himself shows that for 1955 his estimates would be some
50 per cent higher than those implied by ~edfern’s work.(15)
A similar impression is left by a comparison of
the results obtained for other countries by the present
method - shown in Table 2 - with such other information as
is available for some of them from other sources.    The
comparisons poosible are the following:-
(a) Sweden ....The total shown in Table 2 is ~[9,44.1
b-iii~n(Ib) Table I of Income and Wealth     ) sives
Kr. 179.5 billion for all non-agricultural
(15) T. Barna, "The replacement costs ~f fixed assets in
British manufacturing industry in 1955 , Journal of the
pLOygl_l ~tgtj~f~tical S/Ig_i~y, Vol. 120, Part l, 19g ,~,_a~-Te 4;21.
(16)Throughout this study the word "billion" is used in the
the american sense of thousand million.
(17)The measurement of national wealth, (ed. Goldsmith and
Saunders), Income and Wealth, Series VIII, B0wes and Bowes,
London 1959.
reproducible assets in 1952, including investories,
dwellings, consumer durables and subsoil resources.
In 1953 manufacturing and construction accounted for
19 per cent of all non-agricultural fixed capital
formation;(18) applying this ratio would give a
total of about Xr. 34 billion for manufacturing and
construction.
(It has to be admitted that since most fixed
assets in manufacturing are shorter-lived than
similar assets in other sectors, the ratio of
manufacturing capital in total current capital
formation may over-state its ProPortion of the total
capital stock.    It would be exceedingly difficult
however, to make any defensible allowance for this
factor.)
(b) Norway.     A total of Kr. 12,799 million in 1955
prices is given for real capital in mining and
manufacturing in 1953 by the Statistical Yearbook of
Norwax_!96Q, (Central Bureau of Statistics for Norway,
0slo 1960).     Table 359, p.287.     Between 1953 and
1955 the prices of building materials, machinery and
transport equipment rose by 2 per cent in Norway,
so that at 1953 prices this total would be about
Kr. 12,545 million.     Mining and quarrying accounted
for about 5 per cent of the gross product of mining
and manufacturing in 1953, which would imply a
capital stock of about Kr. 12 billion for manufact-
uring, compared with the total of Kr. 20.6 billion
shown in Table 2.
(c) Canada.     The total shown in Table 2 is ~16.96
billion.     Scott(19) suggests a total of ~12.2
billion for structures and equipment in resource
industries and manufacturing in 1955 at 1949 prices
and indicates that at current prices this would be
about ~16 0 billion      "Resource industries"
however~ account for about 40 per cent of this, so
that the total for manufacturing as here defined might
be only about ~I0 billion.
(d) United States.     The total shown for 1954 in Table 2
is about ~180 billion.    Table i of Income and Wealth
gives ~827 billion for all structures and equipment
in 1955.     In that year fixed capital formation in
manufacturing accounted for 18.6 per cent of total
fixed capital formation;(20) applying this ratio
would give about ~154 billion for manufacturing in
1955.
In the context of capital estimates the uncertainties are too
great to justify pronouncements as to absolute right or
wrong.    All that can be said is that the Barna basis employed
(18) Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1960, United
Nations, New York 1961, Table 4, p. 204.
(19)
"Canada’s reproducible wealth", Income and Wealth,
Series VIII Tables III-V, pp. 200-1.
(20) Yearbook of ~ational Accounts Statistics 1960, Table 5
p. 238,
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here seems likely to give significantly higher figures than
estimates based on the "p~rpet~al-inventory" basis which
underlies most of these other totals - many of which are also
net of depreciation rather than gross - with which comparison
has been made.
2. Comparison of capital estimates
For’the purposes of international comparisonp
however, such a tendency would be of no overwhelming
importance provided that it was reasonably consistent as
between each industry in different countries.    On the other
hand it is not entirely unimportant; an over-valuation of
capital will naturally Tend to overstate costs in highly-
capitalistic industries or countries in comparison with
o~he~ indas~les or countries.(21) The comparison of overall
tapital=pe~employee in manufacturing in nine countries shown
in Table ~ may be considered with this in mind.     It should
be remembered that it is capital per head in manufacturing
only which is being compared, not capital per head of total
population.
In general the results are not entirely unconvincing.
(21) Nr Garret Fitzgerald has also pointed out to me that if
capital is relatively under-utilised in a particular country,
as may be the case in Ireland - i.e. a given capital stock is
used to produce a smaller output than would be the case
elsewhere - a tendency to over-estimation in the capital
figures will lead to over-statement of relative costs (and
hence under-statement of relative coefficients) just as it
will      between highly-capitalistic and less-capitalistic
industries or countries in the ordinary sense of the term.
It may be helpful to indicate the likely order of
magnitude involved.    The estimated index of the total factor
coefficient for Irish manufacturing as a whole in 1953
(U.K. = lO0) u~sing the present capital estimates is 95.    if
the capital estimates (for both Ireland and the U.K. ) were
(a) 25 per cent. (b) 50 per cent. (c) i00 per cent too high,
this index would rise to 97, 98 or 99 respectively.    In
other words, a change of i00 per cent in The estimate of
capital stock would result in one of about 4 per cent in the
final index of the total factor coefficient.     In particular
industries of course, the change would be proportionately
smaller or greater than this, depending on the industry’s
relative degree of capital intensity.
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That capital per head in North American manufacturing should
be about twice the U.K. level, is not unlikely; that the
figure for Japan should be less than a quarter of it is
also probable enough; that the figure for Ireland should be
below that for the United Kingdom is also likely, although it
is perhaps surprising that the inferiority is only of the
order of 13 per cent.    Once again, the effects of differing
industrial structures, as well as differences within given
industries, should be borne in mind, however.
The unlikely feature of Table 2, however, is the
suggested per capita figures for the Scandinavian countries,
especially Norway and Sweden.(22)    It is certainly probable
that relatively large amounts of capital are indeed engaged
in the Scandinavian economies; a recent comparison of
European incremental capital-output ratios, for example,
yielded the following results for the period 1949-56:-(2Z)
Denmark 6.6
Germany ~.9
Italy ~.4
Netherlands 5.0
Norway 8.1
Sweden 5.9
United Kingdom 5.4
These results for Denmark and Norway are on the high side,
Even allowing for the backlog of capital losses which
may still have existed in 1955, the German figure looks too
low in relation to the others.     As stated above, the German
and Japanese estimates are wholly or partly based on
independent capital stock figures whose basis of calculation
probably tends systematically to produce lower totals than
would probably emerge from the Barna basis.    The succeeding
results for Germany and Japan should thus be interpreted with
this in mind.     On the basis used here, the overall factor
coefficients for all manufacturing in 1955 (U.K. = IO0) were
121 for Germany and 120 for Japan.    If the capital estimates
employed here for these two countries were (a) 25 per cent
(b) 50 per cent or (c) IOO per cent too low in relation to
those employed for the U.K. and the remaining countries, these
index numbers would be changed as follows:-
Capital stock Germany Japan
+ 25% 112 109
+ 50~ 104 96
+ 1OO% 90 80
A. Maddison, "Economic growth in Western Europe, 1950-59"
Review of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, No. 48, March 1959,
p. 81.
TABLE ~: ESTIMATED CAPITAL STOCK IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1953.
Denmark
Germany
Ireland
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom(a)
Australia
Canada
Japan
United States ( a )
Estimated
total capital
stock at
current prices
Kr. 13,973 nun.
DM 77,624 mu.
£258.6 mn.
Kr. 20,558 mn.
Kr. 44,077 mn.
£14,849 ran.
~A ~, 150 mn
16,962 mn.
Yen 4,320 bn.
~179.9 bn.
Numbers
engaged
O00s
Capital stock per
person engaged
Own
currency
301
5,087
146
262
749
7,602
9 2 4
1,326
4,668
15,760
46,422
15,259
1,703
78,466
58,848
1,953
I    S,$87
12,792
925,449
11,415
£
equivalent
2,399
1,304
1,703
3,925
4,053
1,953
2,709
4,618
925
4,062
(a) Data relate to 1954 throughout.
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but even so they are scarcely sufficiently high to
constitute a corroboration for the results of Table 2 or
to make them entirely convincing.
More light is thrown on this question by a
comparison of average capital-output ratios by industry, as
is provided by Table 3.{24)    Overall capital-per-head in
manufacturing is subject to the same limitation as the
average labour coeffficient for manufacturing as a whole -
it is a reflection of differences in economic structure as
well as of variations in capital intensity in any particular
industry.     For reasonably homogeneous industrial groups,
however, a comparison could be distinctly more revealing.
It is only to be expected that variations would occur from
one country to another~ but on the other hand, the range of
variation should generally be of a smaller magnitude than
that suggested by the per capita comparisons of Table ~.
The overall averages emerging in Table 5 confo1~m
with this expectation.     Tile ratios for manufacturing as a
whole all lie within the range of 1.64 to 3°89, although
the figure for 1954 is probably unrepresentative for the
United States.(~5) For Europe, other than Germany, the range
is only 2.43 - 3.89, or about 60 per cent.     Within this
broad average, however~ wider variations are observable.
In the particular case of the paper industry mentioned earlier,
Table 3 confirms the view that international differences in
its character are so great that the assumption of a constant
(~4) These are calculated by dividing the estimated capital
stock in each industryby thenet output of the industry in
question.
(25) In terms of industrial production 1954 was a bad year
for the United States, in contrast to European experience.
In that year manufacturing output fell by 7 per cent in the
U.S. , whereas in the European countries shown in Table 3 it
rose by between ~ and 12 per cent., Ireland being at the
bottom end of this range.     Ignoring changes in the estimated
capital stock (which are certain to be small over a single
year), the capital-output ratio for 1955 on the basis of
calculation being used here would have been about 1.9.
TABLE~: CAPITAL-0UTPUT RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING !NDUSTRY, 1953
Denmark Germany Ireland Norway Sweden u.K!a) Australia Canada Japan U.8.(a)
I. Food, Drink,
Tobacco ¯4.49 5.04 S .87 2.31 5.25 2.80 5.47 2.19 .2.59 1.85
.2. Textiles 3.07 i .65 S. 45 ¯ 4.04 4.89 4.54 2.68 Z. 05 2.49 2.74
3. Clothing & footwear i .48 0.73 1.64 i .81 i .62 1.45 1.50 0.55 2.13 n.a,
4. ~lood 1.99 1.75 .2.1.2 3.52 2.83 1.54 .2.51 1.97 1.06
~. Paper S .47 2.26 S .29 lC.89 10.64 S .25 5.58 7.52 2.44 .2.80
5. Printing 2 .,~5 1..26 2.45 3.42 2.0.2 2.18 S .17 1. Ol 0,54 C.75
7. ~ubber 1.99 i. 07 n.a. 2 .Ii 2.38 2.15 2.45 0.95 3.55 1.12
8. Chemicals .25 .2.17 .2.58 8.82 5.95 3.09 2.46 2.44 5,96 .56
9. ~±nerals .2.61 1.45 .2.59 .2.50 .2.54 1.75 2.2.2 1.59 1.51 1.24
10. Netals .2 .i0 2.52 1.70 1.58 4.89 2.98 .2.76 1.71 2.52 2.54
II. Metal products
All ~anufacturing: [
2 .~ 1..28 1.23 .2.29 2.52 1.87 1.78 1.12 ~.54 0.99
12. Other Manufactures 2.50 0..27 2.67 1.40 1.25 1.10 1.55 0,57 0.81 0.85
Unadjusted. 2.78 1.69 .2.90 ,3.88 5.89 2.45 2.66 2 .iS
Adjusted!b)
2.55 1.64
.2.42 .25 1.59
NOTES: (a) 1954
(b) Gee text.
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relationship between power equipment and total capital stock
breaks down.
It is advisable, therefore, to use the results of
Table 3 as a test of the reasonableness of the estimates
arising from this method and to exclude from subsequent
calculations any results which appear from Table 3 to be
seriously out of line.    The capital estimates for the
paper industry in Norway, Sweden and Canada clearly come
into this category, as does that for the chemical industry
in }{orway.    The overall capital-output ratios for these
three countries after making these corrections are shown in
Table 3; it will be seen that the adjusted results are much
more in line with other countries as a result.
It will be noted that the estimated capital-output
ratio for Ireland is rather on the high side in comparison
with the United Kingdom and Denmark (and the adjusted average
for Norway.)    This is not a case of its industrial structure
causing a rather deceptive result, as with the labour
coefficient; in seven of the separate industries for which
comparison is possible the irish capital-output ratio is
above the corresponding figure for the United Kingdom -
although one of them, it must be added, is the heterogeneous
group "other manufacturers" in which comparability is
obviously drastically limited.
3. The cost of capital.
Having brought together these estimates of the
capital employed in manufacturing industry in various
countries it is necessary to determine the current charges
conceptually attributable to that capital in order to place
capital on the same footing as labour.     It is customary
to regard the balance remaining from net output after the
deduction of wages(26) as the return on capital.    Matters
(26) And after payment of other "outside" charges~ of course--
rates, adverti’sements, transport costs~ etc.
17
are a little more complicated than this might suggest~
however.    Apart from the various "supplementary costs"
included in net output but unfertunately not separable from
it - other than compulsory employers’ social security
contributions fop which allowance has been made - this
balance of net output has to cover three distinct ingredients:
(a) interest - the current cost of borrowing capital~
o~, to look at it from the lender’s point of view~
the r~ward for accepting the illiquidity of an
industrial asset, profit uncertainties apart,
rather than holding cash;
(b) Depreciation - the sums an enterprise is obliged
to set aside so that the capital can be maintained
and repaired and ultimately the loan repaid or the
asset replaced(27); and
(c) the true profit, the return to enterprise as a
factor of production as distinct from capital,
before payment of taxes.
The problem of estimating the amounts actually set
aside by enterprises under each of these headings is well-
known; quite properly it is generally regarded as insoluble.
For an international comparison of the kind under discussion~
however, the facts of actual practice are less important
than the application of reasonable criteria to all industries
and all countries alike.    An international comparison of
costs should not be affected by differences in accounting
practices with regard to depreciation from one country to
another, for example, or by variations in the extent of
internal finance (and avoidance of interest charges) as
opposed to market finance.     A meaningful comparison can be
achieved only by assuming that given criteria are applied
throughout, whether this happens to be the case in reality
or not.
What notional criteria are suitable, then, for
the computation of capital costs?    So far as interest
charges are concerned, some allowance must obviously be
(27) In their study of U.K. manufacturing industry, ~eddaway
and Smith impute a running charge of 15 per cent on capital
which is specifically stated to exclude any depreciation
element ("Progress in British manufacturing industries in
the period 1948-54", ~conomic Journal, Vol. LXX, No. 277,
March 1960~ p. 21).     There would seem to be no theoretical
justification for excluding depreciation in this way.
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made for variations in the cost of capital in different
countries; if the relative supply costs of capital vary
from country to country - as they do - then the strUCtUre
of a given industry will differ in the countries concerned
so as to take account of it, just as differences in labour
costs influence the use of labour.     In what follows,
therefore the interest cost of industrial capital in each
country has been assumed to be double the current rate on
long-term government bonds, or tlle closest available
alternative.(28)    ?here might be some case for also
applying differential interest rates to correspond with the
varying degrees of risk associated with different industries.
The practical difficulties of doing so are very considerable,
however, and the point can be met equally well by assuming
that the residual rate of "true" profit for any industry
takes account of this differential risk element.
A rule for depreciation, which must be taken to
include expenditures on repair and maintenance, is less
easy to determine.     It is known that practices in this
matter vary tremendously from one enterprise to another and
from one industry to another, to say nothing of inter-
national differences.    Fortunately, however, the analysis
is not concerned with what is done, nor even with what
should be done; all that the comparison requires is the
application of some reasonable criteria consistently,
The word "reasonable" is important, however, since the
(~8)The I.M.F. publication International Financial Statistics
provides a governmental bond yield for the appropriate years
for all the countries involved and it is for this reason
that the government bond rate has been adopted as the basis
of imputed capital charges.    This rate is not given by the
I.~.F. for 195g, however, for Japan and Germany.    The bank
lending-rate has been used instead for the former and an
arbitrary rate of iO per cent for the latter.    Within
reasonable limits, the actual level assumed for interest
rates affects the outcome only to a moderate degree.    For
Irish manufacturing in 195~, for example, an assumed interest
rate equal to the government bond rate (instead of double
it) would raise the total factor coefficient from 95 to
98 (u.K. = lOO).
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application of grossly unrealistic criteria would distort
comparisons between industries or countries which differed
substantially in the matter off capital intensity.
It is generally believed that plant and machinery
usually have effective working lives of between 5 and 15
years implying a "real" depreciation rate of anything between
7 and 2C per cent per annum;    buildings, on the other hand,
will clearly have a longer life, and an annual depreciation
rate of 2 per cent could well be appropriate.     Arbitrarily,
therefore, an overall depreciation rate of 5 per cent per
annum has been adopted in what follows; this may be a
little on the low side; as has already been remarked,
however, the precise value of the assumed rate is of less
importance in this context, provided it is not manifestly
unreasonable, than its consistent application                  :
(29)internationally.
The cost to be imputed industry by industry,
therefore, can be taken as thesum of interest and
depreciation charges.     This, together with total labour
cost, yields an estimate for what is called here the total
factor costs of producing a given net output.    The
difference between total factor costs, so defined, and the
value of net output will represent the true rate of profit
in the industry, before tax, in comparison with the same
industry in other countries.    The ratio between net
output and total factor costs - the "total factor
coefficient" - therefore provides an indication of the
margin between output and cost in real terms - i.e. in terms
(29) The U.K. data, however, seem to indicate that a 5 per
cent overall depreciation rate may be rather high.     The
1960 Blue rook shows that gross capital formation in 1955
by manufacturing industry accounted for 69 per cent of the
total for all companies; if the same ratio is applied to
capital consumption in that year by companies, capital
consumption by manufacturing industry would come out at
about ~o88 million.    This would give depreciation rates
of about 2.6 per cent on the Barna capital estimates and
3.8 per cent on the corresponding ~edfern estimates.
2O
of the factors of production it could purchase in the country
concerned.     It is not necessarily a measure of efficiency
in the ordinary sense of the word, however, since it may
reflect monopoly powers, government support or tariff
protection.(30)
Cne important point calls for stress in this
connection.    The total costs involved in the present
analysis refer, so far as capital is concerned, to
notional rather than actual costs.    This being the case,
it is quite conceivable that total costs, so calculated,
may exceed net output; what is being called the total
factor coefficient (net output~total factor costs) may thus
be less than unity.(31)    This would not necessarily imply
that the industry concerned is operating at a commercial
loss in reality.    The imputed capital costs may differ
from actual costs paid out by the industry because -
(a)    The capital estimates being employed are too high; o_~r
(b) Its capital is valued at historical or written-
down cost, rather than at current replacement
costs, the concept used here; o__r
(c) an interest charge of less than the assumed rate
is being paid on fixed capital as a whole; o_~r
(d) capital is being amortised at less than 5 per
cent of current replacement cost.
A total factor coeffitient of less than unity means, therefore,
not that the industry is currently running at a commercial
loss but that it would be running at an economic loss if
(assuming an unchanged level of efficiency) its capital
were valued at replacement cost, carried the prevailing
level of interest rates, and was being amortised over 20 years.
4. The total-cost position, 1955
If total factor costs are calculated in the
manner described, the relation between net output and its
factor costs can be calculated for each industry and each
~
3O) An attempt to allow for this crucially important latter
actor is made in Part IV below.
(31) This in fact occurs on several occasions, notably (and
not perhaps surprisingly) with the textile industry.
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In Denmark 79 .- !O4
" Germany 8 " " lfi " " " " 116 - !38
" Ireland 8 " " ii " " " ~’ 77 -    97
" Norway 7 " " 10 " " " " i00 - 124
" Sweden 8 " " ii " " " " 76 - 99
" Australia 9 " " 12 " " " " 88 - 99
" Canada 8 " " 11 " " " " i!6 - 13~
I, Japan 6 " " 12 " " " " f[04 - 122
" U.S.A. 10 " 1’ 11 " " " " 105 - 158
country.     The detailed calculations are shown in Table 4;
they are presented for ease of comparison as index numbers
based on the U.K. coefficients~     At first sight the range
of coefficients is bewildering, if not overwhelming; on
closer inspection, however~ something of a paTtern begins
to emerge.     It can be summarised as fol!o~s:-
9 of the 12 lie in the range
In other words, the majority of coefficients - in most cases
the substantial majority - lie within a comparatively narrow
range of ~O points or so.     The least sign of consistency is
found in the case of Norway; seven of the ten observarions
lie in the range I00-124, but one other is as low as 75 and
another is a high as 177.
Ths scope for comparison and speculation provided
by Table ~ is naturally very considerable; the discussion
here will be confined to the findings for Ireland.     In
general, as will be seen, Ireland’s position does not appear
too favourable~     The average coefficient for manufacturing
as a whole is the lowest of the nine countries listed with
the single exception of Sweden.    0nly in three industries -
textiles, metals and metal products - do the Irish
coefficients compare favourably with those of the United
Kingdom and, afortiori, most of the other countries listed.
The Irish coefficients in these industries are not only
higher than those of the United Kingdom but in the ~ases of
both textiles and metal products they compare favourably
with those shown for the other European countries apart
from Germany.     (It will be appreciated~ of course, that all
this is subject to the adjustments which must be made to
allow for the effects of tariff protection°)
INDUSTRY
I. Food, Drink and Tobacco
Textiles
3. Clothing and Footweur
4. Wood
5. Paper
6. Printing
Rubber
8. Che mi c~l s
9. ~ner als
i0. Metals
ii. Metal Pro ducts
12. Other Manufactures
All Manufacturing
U.K. = i00
DENMARK GERt~ANY i IRELAND NORWAY SWEDEN i U-K(a)AUSTRALIAI CANADA JAPAN I U’s!a)l I
i
66 86 ’ 82 177 76 100 63 120 121 124
104 162 / 121 ! 124 99 100
124 117 165 127
85 134 ,t 97 ! 106 97 100 98 122 113 n,a.
83 99 ! 89 i 75 91 100 92 109 122 120
79 121 91 111, n,a, n,a. 100 94 n.a. 129
86 119 89 92 104 100 88 129 183 136
83 1~8 -- 116 102 100 92 157 100 122
82 119 94 n,a° 89 100 110 118 97 105
82 119 8s ! 100 98 100 89 132 145 128
132 116 111 ! 177 t 88 100 99 142 120 119
83 122 105 106 91 100 96 125 104 128
68 99 77 119 118 100 9~ 115 120 109
103 ] 87
I
84 121 95 ! 100 94 118 120 126
Note: (a) 1954.
At the other end of the scale, the low index
number against food, drink and tobacco must give cause
for comment.     The relative coefficients for this industry
in ~enmark and Sweden are also very low, which might
suggest that the capital-indicator may not be operating
too reliably in this sector; against this possibility it
must be remarked, however, that a high ratio emerges for
Norway and for the non-~uropean countries shown in the table.
5. Total costs; Ireland and the U.K., 1958
Detailed Census of Production data are available
for Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1958 and these permit
a more up-to-date comparison of the type attempted in the
previous section; its results are summarised in Table 5.
Between 1953/4 and 1958 the estimated coefficients for
manufacturing as a whole showed a tendency to fall in both
countries, implying that factor costs rose rather more
rapidly than the value of output - that is to say, that
overall prices rose less rapidly than factor costs and that
the share of profits in the final product tended to decline.
On average this process seems to have had equal effects in
the United ~ingdom and ireland, so that the relative
position of manufacturing as a whole in the two countries
was unchanged between 195b/4 and 1958.
This overall stability of relative costs in
Ireland and the United Kingdom is naturally the resultant
of movements in either direction in particular industrial
groups; earlier sections have also stressed the
probability of these divergences from the average becoming
more marked as the industrial classification adopted
becomes finer.     Between 195Z and 1958 Ireland’s cost
position in relation to the United Kingdom would appear
to have weakened considerably in the food~ drink and
tobacco sector and in the manufacture of wood products.
On the other hand, it seems to have improved appreciably in
TABLE 5: TOTAL FACTOR COBFFICiENT8~ UoKo
AND I~ELAND~ 1953-58,
UNITED KINGDOM                                                IRELAND
INDUSTRY Factor coefficients Factor coefficients      U.K. = 100
1954 1958 195~ 1958 1953 1958
i
I
i. Food, drink & tobacco 1.25 Io 30 1.02 0.98 l 82 72
2. Textiles 0.84 0.72 1.02 0.96 I 121
. i 133
Z. Clothing & footwear i 1.19 1 oli 1.15 1.11
i 97 100
4 Wood 1.14 1.12 1.01 0°89 !
89 79
5. Paper i 1.14 10.97
! .04 1.03 91 106
6. Printing !i ~ .12 1.08 ¯
I. O0 1.02 i 89 94
7. Chemicals 1.25 i .14 1.17 1.16 i 94 102
8. f~nerals I 1.22 1.15 i .07 1.11 88 98
9. Metals I 1.06 1.00 1.18 1.20 111 120
i0. Metal products 1. I0 1.20 i.22 105 111
ii. Other 1 1.14I.~7"1.10 1.06 0.81 77 74
I - i t
All manufacturing i .12 I .07 1.O6 1.01 95 i 94
chemicals, textiles, paper, minerals, metals and metal
products.     The change in the position of the food industry
seems to have been due to a combination of a worsening of
the absolute cost position in Ireland and a simultaneous
improvement in the United Kingdom; the opposite was true,
however, for minerals, metal manufacture and metal products.
The strengthened relative position in paper and chemicals
was attributable almost wholly to a worsening in the United
Xingdom, while that in textiles was the outcome of a
worsening in both countries which happened to be of greater
magnitude in the United [[ingdom than in Ireland.
6. The international cost position, 196C
As the comparison comes closer to the present day
it obviously becomes more interesting and useful;
unfortunately it also becomes less reliable, since the
available data tends to become more scanty and heterogen-
eous .    ~evertheless it seems worthwhile to hazard some
estimate of what Ireland’s relative position in terms of
industrial costs looked like in 1960.
Since ~ensus of Production data are not available
on a more or less comparable basis for later than 1958 for
the United Kingdom and Germany, 1954 for the United States
and 195~ for Canada, Japan and the Scandinavian countries,
a variety of sources have to be used to bring the comparison
up to date - national income estimates, where available,
index numbers of industrial production and prices where net.
The results of such an exercise for 1960 are summarised in
Table 6.    A comparison is possible only for manufacturing
as a whole; the variety of experience which may be
concealed in such aggregation has been stressed more than
once above.
Broadly speaking, the impression left by the
findings shown in Table 6 is one of a substantially
unchanged relative position between 195~ and 196C.     Within
24
Europe, the total factor coefficients appear to have
declined in every country except Sweden.     In the United
Kingdom and Germany the overall change was relatively small;
in Denmark and Ireland rather greater; in Norway greatest
of all.     In the three non-Hnropean countries shown, the
rise in the overall Japanese coefficient is especially
striking, while the improvement in the United States
position is no doubt primarily a reflection of the
peculiar circumstances prevailing in the base-year;
reference has been made to this factor earlier.
The relative positions of the countries listed,
however, show no substantial change between 1955 and 1960.
In 195Z the top two positions were occupied by Japan and
Germany; this remained true for 1960, although by then the
United States had moved much closer to their level than in
1955.    The bottom two p~aces in 1955 were occupied by
Ireland and Sweden, and this also remained true in 1960 -
Norway in this case moving closer to their level.
All this, then, relates to the apparent position
between 1953 and 1960 with matters as they stood., The
object of the analysis, however, is to assess the possible
consequences of the reduction, and ultimate removal, of the
tariff barriers from which the industry of all these
countries derived some varying degree of protection.    The
analysis must therefore now turn to the difficult problem
of the measurement of these effects.
PART IV: TH3 EFFECT OF TARIFFS
I.    The tariff level
The problems attached to comparisons of average
tariff levels in different countries are too well known to
require description here.    Like the problem of measuring
the effects of any given tariff, its solution is
impossible in any complete sense.    The most that can be
TABLB 6: ESTIMATED DBVELOPNENT OF TOTAL FACTOR COBFFiCiENTS
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY~ t953-1980.
Denmark
COUNTRY
ii     Bstimated to~al
factor coefficient.
1953
0,94
1960 ii95~
i 100
i
0.86 91
99
Index, U.K. = I00
!953 1960
5     6
84 77
121 121Germany
Ireland
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom(a)
Canada
Japan
u.S.A. (a)
1.36
i .06
1.15
0.97
! .12
1.32
1.~4
1.41
1.35
1.01
li
.93
.!2
! .19
1.76
1.48
i
95
89
96
I00
90
131
105
95
103
87
i00
118
!20
126
90
91
83
100
106
157
132
(a) Base Year 1954
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looked for is an arbitrary procedure which holds out some
prospect of indicating the right orders of magnitude.
For a comparison of European tariff levels on an
industrial basis similar to that used for the analysis of the
two preceding sections, therefore, the following procedure
has been adopted.    For each of the eleven industrial groups
involved a small number of what appear to be representative
products have been selected from the Irish tariff list, and
the rates on these (converted to ad valorem basis where
necessary) set down for Ireland and the other five European
countries in question.    A straightforward arithmetic (un-
weighted) average has then been calculated for each
industrial group and each country.
The arbitrary elements in this procedure will be
obvious.    In the first place, the commodities selected for
comparison may not be truly representative; the entire
comparison rests on only 58 separable items, distributed
over the industrial groups roughly in accordance with the
relative importance of each group in Irish manufacturing as
a whole.    Secondly, ~he use of an unweighted average
implicitly attributes equal importance to each item within
the group concerned which is naturally open to objection;
the average for manufacturing as a whole, however, is
calculated by weighting the rates for each industry by its
net output in 1953.     Finally, customs duties on tobacco,
alcholic liquors and hydrocarbon oils are virtually
~3~) The Irish rates are derived from Table A of my study
The Irish tariff and the B.E.C: a factual survey, with the
additions of the items other than books listed under
,’printing"; these were derived in the same way and from the
same sources as the items shown in that table. The European
rates are taken from the P.E.P. study Tariffs and trade in
Western Europe, Allen and Unwin, London 1959.     The rates
for Ireland are the preferential rates throughout.     In
some cases two sets of rates are operated in the Irish tariff
~em one applicable so long as the cgmmoditv concerned isec~ to quota restriction and the o~ner applicable in the
event of the ending of such restrictions on imports.    In
such cases the latter rate has been chosen slnce it is
presumably the more realistic one so far as protection is
concernea.
It will be appreciated tllat the figures thus
relate to the DOSition in 1959-60. Since that time, howeverg
The progresW o~ both th9 E~E.C~ and the E,F,T.A~ arrangement~nas resul~ea in SUDs~an~ia± reauc~iono, at least so Far as
mutual trade is concerned, in the tariff levels of all the
countries shown except Ireland.
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impossible to compare internationally, import levies
being of a revenue nature in many cases but of a protective
nature in others; of necessity, therefore, those categories
have been omitted from the comparison.
The overall outcome of the exercise is shown in
Table 7.    The fact that the Irish tariff is high in
comparison with other Western European countries is well
enough known; the magnitude of the difference suggested by
the table, however, even though preferential rates are used
for Ireland and the full rates for other countries, is
perhaps unexpected.    It is worth pointing out, therefore,
that the comparison is confined to manufactured products
only; like the United Kingdom tariff, the Irish tariff
on many primary products is lower than the Buropean average,
and this would naturally tend to reduce the gap suggested
by Table 7.
2. Tariff levels and factor coefficients.
If the measurement of average tariff levels is
difficult, the assessment of their effects on home industry
is even more formidable.    The coefficients used in the two
preceding sections are based on the value of net output in a
situation where tariffs exist; to some extent they must
inevitably reflect tariff protection rather than industrial
productivity in its real sense.    How can this effect be
allowed for?
If, in a protected industry, both prices and
wages adjust themselves to take full and equal advantage of
a given tariff rate the level of the labour coefficient in
that industry will of course be unaffected.(~3)    Om the
other hand, the only realistic assumption possible about
wages in the modern world is that, while they will no
doubt rise to take advantage of a tariff wall, it is
(33) In this and subsequent paragraphs the discussion is
conducted in terms of the labour coefficient for ease
of exposition; it will be appreciated that the argument
applies to capital costs equally with labour costs.
TABLE~.:     COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN TARIFF RATES
ON MANUFACTURES.
INDUSTRY.
1. FOOD~ DRINK~ TOBACCO.
2~ TEXTILES,
3. CLOTHING AND LEATHER.
4. WOOD.
5. PAPER,
6. PRINTING,
7. CHEMICALS.
8. MINERALS,
9. METALS.
10, METAL PRODUCTS,
11. OTHER MANUFACTURES.
OVERALL AVERAGE,
AVERAGE TARIFF RATES
IRELAND U.K8 GERMANY SWEDEN DENMARK NORWAY
(PREFEREN-
TIAL) (FULL)
22 11 26 NeAo N.Ao NoA.
39 18 14 10 10 13
48 20 13 13 16 22
4O 14 10 3 4 6
20 18 15 6 7 N.A.
38 0 5 0 2 10
31 13 14 0 6 7
44 15 12 14 9 19
18 10 8 4 0 0
22 11 10 7 13
34 23 11 i3 7 14
17 13 8 8 11
~7
exceedingly improbable that they could be driven down again
if that tariff wall were to be removed.     A comparison of
the competitive position of that industry in the absence of
existing protection would have to assume that the impact
of the tariff reduction would be felt only on the m@rket
value off output and not on the wages bill; the coefficient
itself, in other words, would have to be reduced pari passu
with the fall in protection.
The assumption that prices and wages rise equally
and to the full extent of the tariff is not entirely
realistic, however.    The result of such a sequence would be
that the factor coefficients of the industries concerned
would be unchanged and that the competitive position of the
home industry would be substantially unaltered vis-a-vis
foreign-produced imports.(~4)     But tariffs are imposed in
many cases precisely because home industry is not able to
compete against imports with its technically-given existins
factor coefficients.
A more realistic hypothesis, therefore - certainly
in the Irish case - is that wage-rates are determined by
convention (for example, are related to rates prevailing in,
say, the United Kingdom) and that the effect of a tariff is
not to permit a more or less equal rise in internal wages
but to permit profitable operation at the given wage-level
by a domestic industry which (in the absence of protection)
would not previously have survived at all.     In such a case
the effect of the tariff will be to allow the value of
output (i.e. the price of the product) to rise in relation
to a more or less predetermined wage-bill and to raise the
factor coefficients accordingly.
It is naturally impossible to substantiate this
latter hypothesis conclusively.    The experience of the
(34) Substantially, but not completely, of course, if
profit-margins were positive before the imposition of
the tariff they would be raised pari passu with prices
and wages.
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imposition of the Special Import Levies in Ireland in 1956
does present an opportunity, however, to test it against
the statistical records in some degree.    The levies imposed
in 1956 fell more heavily on certain types of product than
on others.(35)     In the year ending March 31st~ 1957, for
example, they brought in a total of ~4.4 million; of this,
about ~2.5 million, or nearly 60 per cent, was derived from
products falling in the four industrial groups of non-
electrical machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles
and miscellaneous ma.nufactures.    What was the effect on these
four groups?
The relevant data are set out in Table 8.     First,
it is clear that wages did not in general rise in those
groups more rapidly than in the industries enjoying less,
or none, of this new protective shelter.    No significant
differences is discernible at all.    The experience of
prices was in contrast with this.    The average value of
output was raised by 16 per cent between 1955 and 1957 in the
case of non-electrical machinery and by 19-31 per cent in the
other three protected trades; in the rest of Irish industry
it rose only by 6 per cent.(36)
Whether wages rise with prices or not under the
stimulus of tariff protection, then, the conclusion remains
the same.    The effects of the removal of tariffs, if
(~5) It will be appreciated that the object of these levies
was to strengthen the external payments position rather
than to protect home industry as such. Nevertheless they
inevitably had a protective effect.
(~6) The hypothesis that Irish wage-rates are largely
determined exogenously - i.e. by the prevailing U.K. level
in comparable trades is supported by the evidence of the
Census of Production.     This shows for 1964 that in the
majority of cases average earnings in Ireland were 70 - 80
per cent of the U.K. average for the same industry.    Since
it is well known that in recent years industrial earnings
in the U.K. have generally remained well above basic wage-
rates, it seems likely that Irish wage-rates are generally
very close tc the British.    This general stability in the
ratie of Irish to U.K. earnings persists despite wide
variations in relative labour productivities.
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productivity remains constant, can be indicated by reducing the
factor coefficients of the industry concerned in a proportion
comparable to the price increases generated by the initial ~
imposition of the tariff~     The analysis can therefore turn
to concentrate on this latter effect.
3.     Tariffs and net output
The existence of a tariff clearly enables the home
producer to raise his selling price in comparison with that
he could have charged previously; he can thus raise the
value of his net output, even if the latter is unchanged in
real terms.     The Question of the precise effect which a
tariff will have on net output values, as revealed in the
Census of Production, is nevertheless a very complex one.
Four separate aspects may be indicated.
The first is the extent to which a producer will
choose to raise theprice of his product.     Theoretically,
he may raise it to the full extent of the tariff; on the
other hand, he may raise it only to the level at which his
profit becomes - in some sense - fair and reasonable, which
may involve little or no price change.    There are
considerations pointing in each of these two directions.    On
the one hand, it might seem justifiable to assume that prices
will be raised by a percentage equal, or very clo6e, to the
tariff:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
In determining the tarifff, the authorities
presumably have an eye to the minimum level
nece’ssary to secure a reasonable profit for
the home industry;
The producer may fieel that ifi he leaves some
margin of protection unexploited, labour will
proceed to insist on wage increases to absorb
it; and
few producers are likely to ffeel that any level
of profit below that practically obtainable
is in fact fair and reasonable.
On the other hand,, certain factors may work
in the opposite direction, especially in the Irish case:-
(a) Since Ireland has no anti-dumping legislation, it
is argued that the Irish tariff is set high
enough to prevent not only foreign competition of
the ordinary sort but also dumping at below
average cost;
TABLE 8: IMPORT LEVY INDUSTRIES AND
AVERAGE PRICESt 1955-57.
Industry
Non-electric Machinery.
Electrical Machinery.
r~otor Vehicles.
~Fisc. Manufactures.
t
Wage Changes
1955-57
Average Wages (£)
4O9
$62
492
588
I
$65
1955
All Other r:;[anufacturing $29
1957
Index
1955:=
I00
(~12) li;I
4
110
113
112
111
irl"
Price Changes
1955-57
Value of
Net Output
1955=1OO
1957
104.9
115.5
81;2
115.5
t
110 ’] 10 $ . 1
:!
t
Index of
Volume
of Output
1955=1OO
90.5
97.2
66.9
94.8
l     97.6 !
i
! Price
! Change
(5/a)
7
116
119
121
120
106
Source : Statistical Abstract of Ireland.
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(B) Foreign producers may have absorbed part of
past tariff increases in the form of lower
profit-margins, so that the degree of price
protection enjoyed by the domestic producer
is less than the tariff itself; (~7)
(c) The government, in conceding tariff protection
high enough to shut out foreign produce, may
insist upon undertakings from home producers
that prices will not be raised beyond some
specified level; (38)
(d) A high tariff may be adopted merely to break
a habitual, and irrational, prejudice against
a home product equal in price and quality to the
imported product; and
(e) Where consumers are familiar with prices
prevailing in neighbouring countries, the
pressure of public opinion may have th9
same effect as the government control
mentioned in (b) in restraining producers
in their price policy.
The matter may thus safely be described as a fairly
(a9)complex one.
a,
The second aspect worth remembering is that tariff
reductions usually have two sides for an individual producer.
If the fall in the tariff on imports competing with his own
product is part of a general tariff adjustment (as in the
Common Market context it clearly will be), the price of his raw
materials and purchased semi-finished products will be
affected as well as that of his own product.     This would be
particularly important in a country like Ireland, having
little or no basic industry and relying heavily on imported
materials and components.
(37)1t has been suggested that in the United States -
admittedly a highly competitive market - close to a
half of the tariff on manufactures seems to have been
absorbed by foreign producers rather than added on to
prices - ~.E. Kreinin, "Effect of tariff changes on
the prices and volume of imports", American Economic
Review, Vol. LI, No. 3, June 1961, p. ZIT.
(ZS)In Ireland’s case there even exists machinery by which
representations about undue restrictions of competition on
the home market can be made periodically by another
government - i.e. the United Kingdom,
(39)Some light will be thrown on this question by a study
of the relative prices of similar products in Ireland and
*he United Kingdom to be published in a future Institute
paper.     It can be said that the findings of this study
are broadly consistent with the central assumption adopted
in the present work.
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Thirdly, in any particular industry not all
net output is competing with imports, so that some producers
may not need to reduce prices when protection ceases.
For purely physical reasons some elements of most industries
are protected naturally within a substantial range of prices,
whatever the tariff level may be - obvious examples are
bread, bespoke tailoring, daily newspapebs, and repair
services of all kinds.     International competition in
products of this sort may not be impossible, but it is
severely limited.    How much of the net output of an
industry enjoying protection falls into this category
is naturally difficult to say; since international
trade is both practicable and profitable with the majority
of manufactured products; it is not likely to be very
substantial in most industries, however, especially if the
domestic price differential becomes large in relation to
potential substitutes from abroad.
H~ch of these three elements of the problem
tend to the conclusion that the effects of any given
reduction in tariffs of particular products may be
moderated in various ways when related to the overall
net output of the industry concerned.    The fourth element,
however, works very strongly in the opposite direction.
A tariff is levied on the final value of products
entering the home market from abroad.    Its abolition
would therefore involve an enforced reduction in the ~ross
value of the home product; if the cost of raw materials,
fuel, components etc. were largely fixed to the home
manufacturer, therefore, a re/~ively small reduction in
the gross value of output might require a much more
substantial cut in the "value added" component - i.e.
labour costs, capital costs or profits.
Reference to the structure of Irish industry
may help to emphasise the magnitude of this point.
TABL~,%~: ~ROSS/~,T RATIOS.
IRELAND, 1958_
Food
Textiles
Clothing and leather
Wood
Paper
Printing
Chemicals
Minerals
Metals
Metal Products
Other manufactures
(a)
All manufacturing
Value of output
£ million
Gross Net
i 2
146.7
23.2
35.2
8.5
9.8
ii. 0
15.0
8.4
ll. 5
31.3
7.8
308.1
25.8
7.3
14.1
3.6
3.7
6.5
4.5
4.3
4.6
i0.i
3.8
88.2
2 as
% of
1
3
17.6
31.5
40.1
37.8
59.1
30.0
51.2
40.0
32.3
~.7
28.6
(a)
SOURCE;
Excludes drink and tobacco
Statistical Abstract of Ireland,
1960, Pr. 5492, Stationery Office
Dublin 1960, Table 109, pp. 120-22.
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Table 9 sets out the relationship between the values of
gross and net output in Ireland in 1958.     In almost all
of the industries shown - although the important food,
drink and tobacco industry is one of the two exceptions -
net output accounted for between 30 and 50 per cent of the
gross value of output.    Taking 40 per cent as a typical
ratio this would mean that if the cost of raw materials
fuel etc. was fixed, a reduction of i0 per cent in the
value of gross output would require a 25 per cent reduction
in the net output component.    The materials etc. included
in gross output are not all imported, of course; given
Ireland’s lack of basic industry, however, it is certain
that a large proportion is imported at one or two removes,
if not directly.
The forces operating on the value of net output
in the event of a tariff reduction are therefore complex
and divergent.     In each of the aspects listed above there
is considerable scope for the exercise of judgement, and
the result~ obtained will vary substantially as a result.
4. The determination of assumptions
In order to arrive at some reasonable combination
of assumptions, a schematic example is set out in Table i0.
Here it is assumed that a tariff of 40 per cent is to be
removed and the consequential changes in the value of net
output under different assumptions are examined.     The
assumptions themselves are set out in the first columns:
by the "price" assumption is meant that concerning the
extent to which the average domestic price-level of the
industry concerned was raised in response to the tariff
initially, and hence the extent to which it must be
reduced when the tariff disappears; by the "coverage"
assumption is meant the proportion of the industry’s
net output which is assumed to have derived protection
from the tariff; by the "input" assumption is meant the
TABLE .~:       HYPOTHETICAL TARIFF R__ED_UCTION EFFECTS
(REDUCTION OF 40~ ASSUr4ED THROUGHOUT)
BASIC
PRICE
ASSN. ASSN.
L "AVERAGE" CASE
I. 25
75
50
!
5.         50
6.         50
t7.      50
8.      50
.         50
"FooD" CASEI
iI. 50 50
12. 50 50
Iii "PRINTING"
.t13. 50
t14. 50
1
¯ 115.
5o
90
90
90
8O
90
I00
90
9O
90
;ASE
70
70
70
(¢)
I INPUT
ASSN.
50
50
50
50
50
50
25
50
75
0
25
50
0
25
50
COST STRUCTURE (£)
BEFORE TARIFF. REMOVAL
HATERIALS
ETC.
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
8O
8O
8O
4O
4O
4O
AFTER TARIFF REMOVAL
NET
OUTPUT
¯ 40
40
40
40
4O
40
40
40
40
20
20
20
60
60
60
GROSS
OUTPUT
I00
I00
tO0
100
I00
I00
i00
I00
100
100
I00
I00
IO0
100
IO0
HATERIALS NET
ETC. OUTPUT
48 43
48 34
48 25
48 36
48 34
48 32
54 28
48 34
42 40
80 i0
72 18
64 26
40 46
36 50
32            54
1
GROSS
OUTPUT
91
82
73
84
82
80
82
82
82
9O
9O
9O
86
86
86
PERCENTAGE
CHANGE IN
NET
OUTPUT.
+ 7.5
- 15.0
- 37.5
- i0.0
- 15.0
- 20.0
- 30.0
- 15.0
- 50.0
- I0.0
+ 30.0
- 23.3
- 16.7
- I0.0
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extent to which tariff reductions are reflected in a fall
in the cost of raw materials, fuel components etc. (4.0)
Each is expressed in percentage terms.     A price assumption
of 5D per cent, for example, would mean that prices are
assumed to be 20 per cent higher as a result of a tariff
of 40 per cent, and so on.
Consider first what is called in Table i0 the
"average" case: that is to say, an industry where net
output represents about 40 per cent of gross output.     It
will be recalled that in nine of the eleven industries
distinguished in Table 9 the percentage of net to gross
output lay within the range 31-51; a ratio of 40 per
cent can be taken as typical.     In the table nine more
or less representative cases are worked out in detail.
in the first three it is assumed that 90 per cent of the
industry’s net output benefits from the tariff protection
and that 50 per cent of the tariff reduction is felt in
material costs; the effect of changing the price assumption
between 25 and 75 per cent of the tariff is then worked out.
It will be seen that the consequences vary from a rise of 74
to a fall of ZT~ per 3ent in the value of net output.     In
the second trio of cases the price assumption is held at
50 per cent and the input assumption also at 50 per cent;
the coverage assumption is then varied between 80 and i00
per cent.    The impact of net output ranges only from a
cut of i0 per cent to one of 20 per cent.    In the final
trio of examples, the price assumption is held at 50 per
cent and the coverage assumption at 90 per cent;     the
input assumption is then varied between 95 and 75 per cent
Here net output can fall by Z0 per cent at one extreme
(40)In what follows it is ac~umed for the sake of simplicity
that the reduction in tariffs against finished products is
cqual in magnitud0 to .that of simultaneous reductions in the
average tariff paid on imported materials.    This is clearly
an over-simplification, since th.e tariff category o~
materials will by no means always be the same as that on
the related finished product.     Reductions in the former
may be smaller or greater than those in the latter,     it is
difficult, however, to conceive of any alternative procedure
which would be practicable in the circumstances.
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or remain unchanged at the other.
The range of resulting adjustments to net output,
even in these nine selected cases only, is thus very wide
with different combinations of assumptions.     Quite
arbitrarily, although not unreasonably, the subsequent
analysis will operate with each of the results obtained in
the first trio, since these include the widest extremes -
i.e. from a rise of 7½ per cent in the value of net output
to a fall of ~7~ per cent with the removal of a 40 per
cent tariff.     These can be rounded a little to be taken as
(a) a rise of 25 per cent of the tariff change, (b) a fall
of 40 per cent and (c) a fall of i00 per cent.     The reader
can then concentrate attention on the results corresponding
to what appear to him to be the most realistic set of
assumptions.
The two remaining industries justify special
attention since their gross-net proportions differ
considerably from the 60-40 relationship perviously assumed.
As will be seen from Table 9, net output in the food
processing industry in 1958 was about 18 per cent of gross
output; an 80-20 gr0ss/net relationship seems more
appropriate to such a case.     A realistic level for the
various assumptions also requires special consideration.
It seems probable on __a priori grounds that a larger
proportion of the industry’s output is to some degree
immune from foreign competition in the home market
than is the case with industry generally. (41)     On the
other hand, an exceptionally large proportion of the
industryts raw materials are home-produced, so that the
probable level of cost reductions on materials should also
be lower.
(41)Bven though a large proportion admittedly represents
exports, substantial foreign competition at home is
difficult to imagine for many of its products - slaughtering,
baking, ice-cream making, distilling, all come to mind.
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It will be seen from the table that assuming a
price effect of 50 per cent and also that 50 per cent of
the industry’s net output is subject to protection, varying
the assumed saving on material costs between zero and 50
per cent results in changes in net output ranging from a
fall of 50 per cent to a rise of 30 per cent.     Once again
the extreme points of this range of results can be adopted
and translated into a trio of assumptions that for this
industry tariff reductions will involve a
change in net output amounting to (a) a fall of lO0 per
cent, (b) a fall of 25 per cent and (c) a rise of i00
per cent of the tariff itself.
The final case is that of the printing industry,
whose net output accounted for 59 per cent of gross output
in 1958; a 40-60 gross/net relationship therefore seems
more appropriate.     Further, it is an industry in which
foreign competition in the home market is probably less
extensive than for most industries, although probably not
so much so as with the food industry.(42)    Hence a
"coverage" assumption of 70 per cent has been adopted in
the table.    It is also an industry in which the range
of cost-saving resulting directly or indirectly from tariff
reductions on materials is not likely to be as great as
in other trades; the greater part of its material costs
consists of paper on which the rate of import duty is
very low indeed.(43)    Varying this assumption between
zero and 50 per cent, therefore~ the range of effects
on net output with a 40 per cent tariff moves from a fall
of 23 per cent to one of i0 per cent.     Taking the range
of results shown in the table again, the assumptions
adopted have been that tariff reductions cut net output
(42)Daily newspapers, books and journals of local
interest and government publications come to mind.
(43)Table B of my study The Irish Tariff and E.E.C. shows
that in 1959-60 import duties on paper amounted to only 7
per cent of the value of imports.
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by (a) 60 per cent, (b) 40 per cent, and (c) 25 per cent
of the tariff itself.
The "tariff adjustment factors" emerging from
this analysis - they are summarised for convenience at
the foot of Table ii - are clearly very arbitrary, and
views will inevitably differ about their realism in
particular cases.    The schematic outline of Table i0,
of course, enables the reader to feed in any alternative
assumptions which seem more realistic without great
difficulty.    For the purposes of the present study it
will be assumed that the middle set of assumptions (shown
as (b) in table ii) is probably most realistic, with (a)
and (c) as optimistic and pessimistic sets of assumptions
respectively.    This would seem to accord with the
experience of the Special Import levies in 1956.    These
amounted to 60 per cent full and 40 per cent preferential
for "luxury" commodities and to 37~ per cent full and
25 percent preferential for less dispensable products.
Since about two-thirds of Ireland’s imports of the type of
commodity concerned come from the United Kingdom(A~) the
preferential rates were substantially the operative ones,
and since most of the products involved were of the ’luxury’
type, the average additional tariff was probably of the
order of 35 per cent.     The "central,’ assumption of Table
ii, (b), postulates a price increase of 40 per cent of a
tariff increase; this would imply that the 1956 levies
resulted in a rise in the average value of the net output
of the industries concerned of around i0 per cent.
Reference to Table 8 above shows that (in relation to
that of all other manufacturing industry) it was in fact
(45)about 12 per cent.
~4)See categoriBs 6--9 of Table ii in my study The Irish
Tarzff and E.E.C.
(45)See also footnote (39) above.
IRB LAND
GERMANY
DENMARK
NORWAY
b
C
C
TABLE ~: ESTIMATED TOTAL FACTOR COEFFICIENTS~ NET OF TARIFF EFFECTS~ ,!950.
U.K. = iOO
Food,
Drink,
Tobacco
68
75
85
7O
71
96
n,a.
n.a.
n.a.
noao
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
B.a.
Textile.~
122
104
86
159
165
168
93
99
104
92
97
103
Clothing
and
Leather
98
81
6O
91
95
102
Woo d
91
76
59
98
i01
103
86
93
99
Paper
87
86
85
118
122
125
n, a.
n.a.
n.a.
?rinting
65
72
77
114
115
117
i00
i00
i00
Chemical~
93
g2
71
119
117
117
83
90
98
89
73
55
117
119
122
Eetals
108
102
97
r~et al
Product,’
103
93
8O
Other
manu f ac-
tures.
76
7O
65
I109113117
77
79
81
95
94
92
74 70
79 75
85 82
67 n.a.
69 n.ao
72 noa.
77
77
77
nQa,
n.a.
n.a.
74
77
81
n,a6
n.a.
noa,
94
9~
9-~
All
Manufac-
turing.
83
84
91
73
76
8O
nta°
n.a.
n.a.
114
i16
118
83
85
89
117
125
134
153
164 .
176
117
127
IZ8
85
92
i01
73
80
90
92
99
106
114 117
124 121
136 127
iii 89
118 92
150 96
60 77
66 80
75 84
104 99
109 103
119 104
Assumed effects of tariff reduction (%) on net output (% of tariff change):-
(a) Food, - i00; printing, - 60; other, + 25
(b) Food, - 25; printing, - 40; other, - 40
(c) Food, + I00; printing, - 25; other, -i00.
PART V: CONCLUSION
It remains only to bring the various strands
together in order to arrive at some broad impression of
the position prevailing at more or less the present time.
The chasms in the data over which the analysis has had
to leap from time to time have been stressed often
enough, and their width - and depth - need not be
emphasised yet again.    They should not, however, be
forgotten.
Table 6 above presented an international
comparison of the factor coefficients in separate
industries as they appeared to be in 1953.    Two steps
are necessary to arrive at the final picture of the
approximate position today.    First, allowance must be
made for the estimated development of factor coefficients
between 195~ and 1960 as summarised in Table 5.    The
estimates in that table related to manufacturing as a
whole, and it has been shown and emphasised more than
once in the preceding paragraphs that aggregation at
this level will inevitably conceal marked diverse
movements in particular sectors.    Nevertheless account
has to be taken of developments during 1953-60, and in
the absence of detailed data for each industrial category
the coefficients for all the industries of each country
have been multiplied by the index number shown in column
4 of Table 8.
The second adjustment necessary is the allowance for
the effect of tariffs on the level of net output.
As was argued in the previous section, a wide range
of results could follow from different assumption;
the coefficients have therefore been adjusted in
accordance with each of the three "representative"
results described in the peevious section.    This allowm
the reader~ on the one hand~ to examine the results
obtained with what might be thought to be reasonabiy
realistic assumptions; on the other hand, it also
indicates the magnitude of the differences introduced
into the comparison by variations in the tariff-effect
assumptions.
The use of the same adjustment factors for all
countries implicitly assumed that the effects of tariffs
are much the same in other countries as they are in
Ireland.    Clearly this may notbe the case, but it seems
likely on a priori grounds that the magnitude of the
differences which exist in practice would be relatively
small, so that there would be little point in attempting
to assess these effects separately for each country, even
assuming the availability of the data necessary for this
purpose.
Having made these two sets of adjustments, the
final estimateu of the total factor coefficients for 1960
emerge.    They are shown in Table ii as index numbers with
the coefficient for the United Kingdom being taken as IOO
in each case.     In view of the accumulation of assumptions
and estimation built into these figures, it would hardly
be prudent to attach much significance to differences of
less than about i0 per cent.
Given this range of error, it could be said that
coefficients within the range of around 95-105 are
indicative of a competitive position comparable with that
of British industry.,    That is to say, the cushion of
profit in real factor terms would be roughly equal to that
enjoyed by Eritish producers; by implication the
"squeezability" of the industry in the face of intensified
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competition would be about equal to that of the British
industry.    How would this ~est apply to Ireland 9    If
the middle assumption - case (b) in Table ii - is adopted,
only two industries - textiles and metals - fall clearly
within the range.     The importance of the metal manufacture
industry is, of course, rather limited for Ireland!46) so
that the indications would appear to be that the textile
industry may be the only major Irish industry which
currently enjoys a strong competitive position in comparison
with most of its European counterparts.    The calculations
highly approximate as they are, would also suggest that the
metal products industry may just scrape into the competitive
\
range vis-a-vis the United Kingdom.
With the eight remaining industries the results
are of such a level - and, for that matter, so similar -
that it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that they
may reflect a general and fundamental weakness in the Irish
industrial cost situation.     Three 6f them - clothing and
leather, paper and chemicals - lie within the range 81-86
although it is worth noting that in most instances the
United Kingdom coefficients which are being used as a basis
of comparison may be somewhat high by general European
standards.     In the remaining five industries the index
numbers lie in the range 70-76, which is well below the
level of the United Kingdom although by no means that of
all other countries shown in every case.
The broad conclusion which emerges from a
comparison of the Irish cost structure with that of its
nearest and most likely competitor under conditions of
(46)In 1958 its net output was about ~.5 per cent of the
total for manufacturing industry and it employed about
6,600 people.
(47)It will be noted that in the crucialiy important case
of food, drink and tobacco, comparison is possible for
only one country other than the U.K. and is by no means
unfavourable to Ireland.
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free trade therefore seems fairly clear,    The textile
industry is the only major irish trade whose competitive
position seems to emerge as a relatively confident one;
the production of metals would appear to be in a similar
position but is of limited importance; the metal products
industry may also lie on the margin of the competitive
range.     For other Irish industries - accounting for over
80 per cent of total industrial net output in 195~ - the
competitive position, measured on this profit-margin or
"squeezability" basis, would appear to be anything from
12 to 30 per cent below the U.K. level.
How far is this conclusion modified by varying
the tariff-effect assumptions underlying the calculations ?
If one adopts the most optimistic of the trio of
assumptions - case (c) for food and printing and (a) for
the remaining industries - then clothing and (marginally)
\
chemicals move into the range of competitiveness vis-a-vis
the U.K.;     the proportion of 1953 net output failing to
reach this competitive range would be reduced from about
80 to about 65 per cent.     If the most pessimistic of the
trio of assumptions is adopted, however, only the metal
industry would remain in the competitive range.
At the risk of wearisome repetition it has to
be emphasised yet again that these general coefficients for
broad industrial categories certainly conceal widely
varying coefficients in the various trades of which each
is made up, and even more so in the individual enter-
prises in each trade.     That this must be so is suggested
by the fact that substantial exports are maintained by
Irish producers in almost every group listed in Table ii -
although mostly, it must be admitted, with the aid of
preferential entry into the protected British market.
It is also worth remembering that enterprises may retain
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export markets only by allocating an unduly large share
of overhead costs to products sold within the protected
domestic market, a device which mould cease to be
practicable if the protection disappeared.
The need for caution in applying the general
results of this analysis to any particular situation is
nevertheless evident and imperative; on the other hand,
it would be unreasonable to suppose that the necessity
for a relatively high level of aggregation must
necessarily invalidate its broad outcome.     Averages have
their limitations but are not meaningless; if an average
conceals particular results which are exceptionally good
they must, i_pso facto, contain results which are
exceptionally bad.
Above all, it must be remembered that this
study has been concerned with an attempt to assess the
comparative position of Irish industry in 195~-60 if it
had been plunged into a Common ~arket situation with its
existing and unchanged state of efficiency.     It can
reasonably be argued that the v~ry movement into such a
situation would in itself cause substantial and fairly
rapid effects on industrial efficiency, although it is
necessary to remember that the same effects will
presumably also be felt simultaneously in the other
countries with which comparison has been attempted~ only
one of which, in the final comparison, is currently a
member of the E.E.C.    To assess the relative impact of
such effects, however, is the business of informed
prophecy, not of empirical analysis; and the scope of
the present study may well be thought to have been
ambitiaus enough without wandering into such esoteric
regions.
